Post by account_disabled on Mar 8, 2024 23:04:50 GMT -5
Regarding the second, this expert indicates that “it is linked to the previous one and the magistrate himself wonders what is considered exceptions of due justification , the due justification with respect to national law, as indicated in the Directive in its recital 81, or with respect to another type. of non-legal criteria.”
In Puelles' opinion, “it is justified because it is clear that the criterion used by the Spanish legislator, the consideration of a fair and supportive society, is not a legal criterion, but Fax Lists rather a revenue criterion .” In this regard, he indicates that “the approach is not idle because it can be determined in some way that the justification given by the Spanish State that uses a “non-legal” criterion for this purpose is not considered appropriate.
As for the third question, “it is related to whether this due justification for the exclusion of the exoneration of public law credits must be specific for that category of (public) debts, or can it be the same for other categories of debts. ” (the example given is debts derived from criminal offenses).
In his opinion "the issue is not trivial either, because if the justification is for debts of different origin , this may determine that the justification is considered ambiguous, generic and hollow and, therefore, not the proper one required by the Directive."
Regarding the fourth, Judge Soriano “raises a more than interesting circumstance: if the due justification given for the non-exoneration of public credit is to be in the presence of a fair and supportive society, doesn't that same justification serve to exonerate public credit in its entirety if we are facing a fair and supportive society? It is evident that the resolution of such an issue is interesting.”
In Puelles' opinion, “it is justified because it is clear that the criterion used by the Spanish legislator, the consideration of a fair and supportive society, is not a legal criterion, but Fax Lists rather a revenue criterion .” In this regard, he indicates that “the approach is not idle because it can be determined in some way that the justification given by the Spanish State that uses a “non-legal” criterion for this purpose is not considered appropriate.
As for the third question, “it is related to whether this due justification for the exclusion of the exoneration of public law credits must be specific for that category of (public) debts, or can it be the same for other categories of debts. ” (the example given is debts derived from criminal offenses).
In his opinion "the issue is not trivial either, because if the justification is for debts of different origin , this may determine that the justification is considered ambiguous, generic and hollow and, therefore, not the proper one required by the Directive."
Regarding the fourth, Judge Soriano “raises a more than interesting circumstance: if the due justification given for the non-exoneration of public credit is to be in the presence of a fair and supportive society, doesn't that same justification serve to exonerate public credit in its entirety if we are facing a fair and supportive society? It is evident that the resolution of such an issue is interesting.”